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ROBERT MACK BELL: 
LEADERSHIP, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN MARYLAND 
LENNEAL J. HENDERSON∗ 
Chief Judge Robert Mack Bell was both a product and a driver of 
his times.  His work, impact and legacy as Chief Judge of the Maryland 
Court of Appeals represent a vivid and dynamic study of the socializa-
tion, brilliance, and leadership of a scholar, jurist, policymaker, and 
administrator.  If socialization is defined as the continuing process 
whereby an individual acquires a personal identity and learns the 
norms, values, behavior, and social skills appropriate to his or her so-
cial position,1 then Chief Judge Bell experienced one of the most un-
usual, exceptional, intense, and thorough socialization experiences of 
anyone of his generation. 
Like so many families described in Isabel Wilkerson’s epic The 
Warmth of Other Suns,2 Bell and his family moved from the South to cit-
ies in the North.  His family moved from Rocky Mount, North Caroli-
na “north” to Baltimore, Maryland when Bell was a boy.  Less than 400 
miles north of his birthplace, Baltimore would become Bell’s educa-
tional and legal laboratory and the venue of major civil rights events, 
victories, and leadership that would influence and stimulate the 
young Bell. 
Even before graduating from Dunbar High School in Baltimore 
on June 17, 1960, Bell and eleven other students sat-in at Hooper’s 
Restaurant at the corner of North Charles and Fayette Streets.  De-
spite the restaurant’s policy to deny service to “negroes,” the twelve 
high school students sat down in the restaurant resulting in their ar-
rest in conviction for misdemeanor trespassing.3  Bell himself indi-
cates that he had minimal consciousness of the significance of his ac-
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tions at this point in his life, but something within him recognized the 
injustice of this situation and the imperative of action.4 
Bell and his brothers in protest were convicted in the Circuit 
Court of Baltimore City and fined $10.00 each.  Eventually known as 
Bell v. Maryland,5 Bell and his colleagues appealed the conviction to 
the Maryland Court of Appeals.  Juanita Jackson Mitchell and Thur-
good Marshall represented these young appellants who argued that 
use of the state’s trespassing laws to enforce racial segregation in pub-
lic accommodations violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution.  On January 9, 1962, the conviction was up-
held by the very same Maryland Court of Appeals Bell would lead 
thirty-five years later.6 
Subsequently, Bell appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  Bell was represented by legal legends Constance Baker Motley 
and Jack Greenberg.  The Supreme Court pondered whether to issue 
a ruling in the case but, noting that in the intervening period between 
Bell’s conviction and the Supreme Court appeal, the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly had enacted a public accommodations law, the Court 
was silent on the matter of whether the state’s trespassing laws could 
be invoked to exclude African Americans from public accommoda-
tions such as restaurants.7  The Court did vacate the decision of the 
Court of Appeals to allow the court the opportunity to apply the state 
law ex post facto to Bell and, by doing so, to reverse his conviction.  
Bell’s conviction was eventually reversed in 1965 when he was a junior 
in college.  Ironically, the Civil Rights Act of 1964—passed the previ-
ous year—had already banned racial discrimination in public accom-
modations, including restaurants.  The trial, however, allowed Bell to 
observe the actions, processes, structure, and leadership of Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren and the work of Associate Justices Hugo Black, Wil-
liam O. Douglas, Tom C. Clark, John M. Harlan, Byron White, and 
Arthur Goldberg.8  Thus, between ages sixteen and twenty-one, Bell 
had already acquired an unusual and in-depth education in the law 
and the reputation of an activist. 
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Reminiscent of the five cases comprising the landmark Brown v. 
Board of Education,9 decided on May 17, 1954, Bell v. Maryland was one 
of five cases involving segregation protests decided on June 22, 1964.  
The other four cases were Griffin v. Maryland,10 Barr v. City of Colum-
bia,11 Robinson v. Florida,12 and Bouie v. City of Columbia.13  In none of 
these cases did the Supreme Court reach the merits of any argument 
addressing whether private actions of segregation, which are enforced 
by state courts, constituted a state action that violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  These decisions were 
announced two days after the Senate ended a filibuster and passed 
the bill that would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 which out-
lawed segregation in public accommodations.  It has been suggested 
that the Supreme Court refrained from reaching the merits in these 
cases in consideration of the pending Civil Rights Act; had it done so, 
it may have eliminated the basis for passing the legislation.15 
While Bell v. Maryland wound a tortuous path through the thick-
ets of judicial and legislative process, Bell was witness to another mo-
mentous development in civil rights in Baltimore in 1963: the integra-
tion of Gwynn Oak Park.16  This development occurred almost 
parallel to preparations for, and the convening of, the Great March 
on Washington for Civil Rights on August 28, 1963.  Gwynn Oak Park 
was opened only to whites in 1963.  On July 4, more than 300 people 
assembled at the Metropolitan United Methodist Church in West Bal-
timore under the leadership of the Congress of Racial Equality, the 
Maryland Council of Churches, and the New York headquarters of the 
Campus Americans for Democratic Action.  This coalition included 
leaders of prominence from all faiths and from whites as well as 
blacks.  The objective was to protest racial exclusion at Gwynn Oak 
Park in Woodlawn, just outside of Baltimore.  Like many restaurants, 
parks, recreation centers, and movie theaters, Gwynn Oak Park main-
tained a rigid “whites only” policy.  Columnist Gilbert Sandler wrote: 
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 Among the protesters were the Rev. William Sloane Coffin, 
chaplain at Yale University; Rabbi Israel M. Goldman of Chi-
zuk Amuno Congregation; Monsignor Austin L. Healy of the 
Archdiocese of Baltimore; Rabbi Morris Leiberman of the 
Baltimore Hebrew Congregation; the Rev. Dr. Eugene Car-
son Blake, stated clerk of the United Presbyterian Church; 
the Rev. John T. Middaugh, senior minister at Brown Me-
morial Presbyterian church; and representatives of the Na-
tional Council of Churches.  The group discussed how the 
protest was to be carried out peacefully, and whether partic-
ipants were willing, individually and collectively, to go to 
jail.17 
Met by hostile bystanders when they arrived at the gates of the 
park, 560 police officers, led by Baltimore County Police Chief Robert 
Lally, cordoned off the protesters.  Lally charged the protesters with 
violating the Maryland Trespass Act and ordered them arrested.  Em-
barrassed by locking up so many clergymen, he said, “‘As chief of po-
lice I have no alternative.  The law of Maryland says they can’t tres-
pass.  I can’t legislate.’”18  They were driven in school buses to the 
Woodlawn police station.  Fortunately, Attorney Robert Watts, who 
later became a judge, served as counsel for the group and, although 
the protest continued, the tension was diffused.  After Gwynn Oak, 
progress was made in desegregating a number of recreational centers, 
amusement parks, and other venues previously denied to blacks. 
In August 1963, Baltimore County Executive Spiro T. Agnew 
convinced the County Council to create a Human Relations Commis-
sion.  One of its first actions was to declare Gwynn Oak Park open to 
all citizens as well as to issue rules and regulations designed to dis-
courage racial discrimination in selected public accommodations in 
Baltimore County.19  Although Gwynn Oak closed in 1974 following 
devastating damage from a hurricane and flood,20 the young Robert 
Bell was witness to another civil rights success early in his life. 
Thus, as a high school and college student, Bell was intensely ex-
posed to grassroots local and national civil rights advocacy; to the law 
and ethics of social justice; and to the federal, state, and local judici-
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ary and legislative processes.  As part of his education, as well as his 
socialization, he would learn from experience the meaning of federal-
ism in public policymaking, judicial review, legislative action, and the 
varied and diverse ways law enforcement and social institutions inter-
pret and use the law.  Through his experience with Juanita Jackson 
Mitchell, Vernon Dobson, Thurgood Marshall, Clarence Mitchell, Jr., 
Constance Baker Motley, and Jack Greenberg, he would also learn the 
meaning of courageous, interracial, interdenominational, and inter-
faith leadership.  Aside from his parents, there is little doubt that 
these leaders and activists were collective mentors to the young Rob-
ert Bell.  Mentoring is a vital aspect of socialization.  As Professor Lar-
ry S. Gibson indicates in his book, Young Thurgood, mentoring, partic-
ularly in an environment of intense challenges, is fundamental to the 
development of talent, activism, and constructive change.21 
In addition, as a scholar, he studied history and political science 
at Morgan State University (formerly College) under such academic 
luminaries as Benjamin Quarles, Robert Gill, and James Fleming.  His 
studies in history would make him keenly aware of the tragedies, trav-
ails, triumphs, and trials of the African American odyssey in America, 
in Maryland, and in Baltimore.  His studies in political science would 
introduce him to the dynamics of political power and the potentiali-
ties of public policy for social change and racial justice.  Today, he 
remains an ardent and meticulous student of history and a keen ob-
server of the use and abuse of political and legal authority.  But his 
experience in civil rights advocacy, with local, state, and federal law, 
and his primary knowledge of emerging statutory and constitutional 
developments between 1960 and his graduation from Morgan State 
University in 1966, would provide a unique preparation for his legal 
studies at Harvard University.  As the first African American from 
Morgan State University to attend the Harvard Law School, he would 
immerse himself in the study of the law and the diverse and intense 
intellectual and international activities of Harvard University.  He 
brought to Harvard a unique experience and perspective.  He ob-
tained from Harvard rigorous and extensive preparation in legal 
scholarship and practice. 
In addition to his parents, his high school, his activist and legal 
experience, his college, and his law school, Bell’s socialization was al-
so emotional and spiritual.  He acquired the values of calm and stra-
tegic acuity in difficult situations and a penchant for evidence and da-
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ta.  He learned to communicate at levels of eloquence and impact 
rarely seen in any generation.  He learned an axiology of fairness and 
decency, and a respect for appropriate process and decorum.  He 
would acquire exceptional interpersonal skills and a talent for direct 
but respectful communication.  And he would become a dapper 
dresser, not just to make a statement but to create an appropriate and 
unique ambience.  His legal and judicial acumen certainly includes an 
outstanding experience in legal matters pertinent to race but extends 
to many other specialties in criminal and civil law. 
His baptism and socialization in the politics and legalities of civil 
rights occurred between 1960 as a Dunbar High School student and 
1969 when he completed his legal studies at Harvard.  In that nine-
year period, the Supreme Court would rule on Boynton v. Virginia,22 a 
race and interstate commerce case; Gomillion v. Lightfoot,23 a gerry-
mandering case in Tuskegee, Alabama; Baker v. Carr,24 the “one man, 
one vote” case in Tennessee; Engel v. Vitale,25 the school prayer case; 
Schneider v. Rusk,26 a case on the rights of naturalized U.S. citizens; 
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,27 on the closing 
of the public schools to avoid integration; Reynolds v. Sims,28 on one-
man-one-vote in state senate elections; Malloy v. Hogan,29 applying the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to state as well as 
federal courts; Escobedo v. Illinois,30 on the right to remain silent follow-
ing arrest; Cooper v. Pate,31 on the rights of prisoners to have standing 
to sue in federal courts to address grievances under the 1871 Civil 
Rights Act; Beck v. Ohio,32 on the issues of probable cause and searches 
incident to lawful arrest; McLaughlin v. Florida,33 striking down anti-
miscegenation laws aimed at preventing cohabitation of interracial 
couples; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States34 and Katzenbach v. 
McClung,35 both on violations of civil rights in interstate commerce; 
                                               
 22.  364 U.S. 454 (1960). 
 23.  364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 24.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 25.  370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 26.  377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
 27.  377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
 28.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 29.  378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 30.  378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 31.  378 U.S. 546 (1964). 
 32.  379 U.S. 89 (1964). 
 33.  379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 34.  379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 35.  379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
  
2013] TRIBUTES TO CHIEF JUDGE ROBERT M. BELL 1085 
Miranda v. Arizona,36 on the right to remain silent and self-
incrimination; Whitus v. Georgia,37 on racial discrimination in jury se-
lection; and Loving v. Virginia,38 prohibiting state statutes banning in-
terracial marriage.  In this same nine-year period, the vigorous civil 
rights protests and strategies, the lobbying of Clarence Mitchell, Jr.,39 
and the leadership of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell as Chair of 
the powerful House Education and Labor Committee,40 produced a 
torrent of unprecedented statutory activity on or related to the civil 
rights of citizens.  These included the Civil Rights Act of 1960,41 on 
voting rights in the South; the 1962 Manpower Development and 
Training Act;42 the 1963 Equal Pay Act,43 aimed at abolishing wage 
disparity based on gender; the 1964 Civil Rights Act;44 the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 196445 (the poverty program); the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965;46 the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965;47 the 
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966;48 
two civil rights acts in 1968, one on fair housing49 and the other pro-
tecting the rights of American Indians not residing on reservations.50 
By 1969, when Robert M. Bell received his law degree from Har-
vard, passed the Maryland bar, and began his career at the Baltimore 
firm Piper and Marbury, he was twenty-six years old and thoroughly 
familiar with these complex and far-reaching legislative and judicial 
developments.51  As a result, he was educated and trained in civil and 
criminal law and was familiar with the issues of administrative law so 
essential to the implementation of both statutes and court decisions.  
Even in the early 1970s, considered by many historians and legal 
scholars to represent a kind of backlash to the momentous and tu-
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multuous 1960s,52 Chief Judge Bell understood that the law carried 
forward in such statutes as the Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971,53 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,54 the first renewal of 
the Voting Rights Act,55 and the efforts of newly elected Baltimore 
Congressman Parren Mitchell to incorporate a “minority business set-
aside” provision into the Public Works Act.56  By 1975, when Governor 
Marvin Mandel appointed Bell to the District Court in Baltimore at 
age thirty-one as the youngest district judge,57 his socialization, activ-
ism, education, exposure, experience, and acuity were those of a 
much older and wiser jurist.  He appreciated Baltimore’s unique role 
in the struggle for these political, statutory, and judicial develop-
ments—exceptional preparation for his eventual role of Chief Judge 
of the Maryland Court of Appeals. 
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